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Euthanasia, Benemortasia, and the Dy 19 
William E. May 
The phenome nal advances in bio-
medical technologies a re respons-
ible for loo king with renewed ur-
gency at the questio n of the care o f 
the dying. Because of the va rio us 
procedures tha t can now be taken 
to prolong life, it is necessary to as k , 
as Kieran Nolan does in his essay 
o n "The Care of the Dy ing", "whe-
ther the medical assistance be ing 
provided to some pa tients is really 
In this article, William M ay dis-
tinguishes between the two ethics 
of death to pro vide f resh ans wers t o 
the ete rnal question: what consti-
tutes a good or happy death ? 
Dr. May is a professor in the de-
partment of re ligion and re ligious 
education at the Catholic Univer-
sity of America. 
helping to preserve the ir lives o r 
whether it is simply prolonging the ir 
death."1 
The proper c are o f the dying is 
allied with the debate over e uthan-
asia , and it is imperative to begin a 
discussion of this subject by making 
~orne remarks about termino logy. 
Some writers, among them the re-
doubtable Joseph Fletche r, dis-
tinguish between two kinds o f eu-
thanasia, positive and negative, o r 
direct and indirect. The first con-
114 
sists of direct actions, o r a c of 
commission , designed to te rn •ate 
the life o f an individual fo r hu :me 
reasons. The second does n< in· 
vo lve any di.rect ac ts that ' ,uJd 
bring the individual's life to a• l!nd 
but rather consists in omitt it ac· 
tio ns o r discontinuing proce JTes 
that maintain or might mainta the 
individual in existence .. 
Many other write rs, among 1em 
Pa ul Ramsey and Arthu r Dye and 
most Roman C atholic mora list vig· 
o ro usly reject this two fold d i -;ion 
of euthanasia. T hey do so be tUSe 
they believe (and o ne of the , ajor 
purposes of this paper is to how 
why the ir be lief is soundly l tsed) 
tha t lumping into the one g._ 11eral 
c ategory of euthanasia both acts 
that directly terminate life and acts 
that are not, of themselves, directly 
destruc tive of life is to confuse 
matters horribly and to be!! the 
questio n in discussing intell igently 
the issues raised in the proper care 
of the dying. Ramsey, for instance, 
argues that the term euthanasia has 
acquired a meaning now similar t~ 
the meaning of "mercy kill ing:· Be-
cause o f this identificatio n of eu· 
thanasia in common speech with 
mercy killing he pro poses to use the 
te rm agathanasia to indicate a hap· 
py or good death . and to use this 
te rm to describe activit ies that 
Linacre Quarterly 
Fletcher and others would call "neg- that a ph~ · .. m may knowingly, fo 
ative euthanasia."2 · sufficient .;on , shorten a patien t'~ 
In similar fashion Dyck points expecta ti f life - whic h cannot 
out that the term euthanasia o rigin- be denie c and one is compelled 
ally meant a painless or happy death, to a dm it he may knowingly, fo r 
without any refe rence to whether suffic ient "lson, put an end to his 
such death was induced . Although patie nt's lt'L immediately" .s 
this definition still appea rs in mod-
em dictionaries, ·the meaning of 
this term that has become prevalent 
in our culture is that it is "an act or 
method of causing death painlessly 
so as to end suffering."3 Accor-
dingly he proposes a new term , bene-
mortasia, to designate a · happy o r 
good death. Dispute can then take 
place over what constitutes a good 
or happy death.4 
With these remarks about te rm in· 
ology in mind, we can now seek to 
isolate the basic issue a t sta ke be· 
tween those who advocate eu than-
asia, whether this be di rect or indi· 
rect, positive or negative, and those 
wbo vigorously oppose positive eu-
thanasia yet defend a po licy o f bene· 
mortasia or agathanasia. The basic 
~ue lies in the validity of the dis-
~mction between active ly terminat-
mg a human life o r causing death 
and allowing or pe rmitting a person 
to die. 
On the one ha nd , one group of 
moralists (Fletche r, fo r ins ta nce) 
and lawyers (G Jan ville Williams, 
f~r example) mainta in that the dis-
t~ction is meaningless a t best and 
diShonest at worst , for in the end 
everything turns out the same : a 
~uman being dies. Since the result 
~ the same Williams feels justified 
•n writing: "There is no logical o r 
Dloral chasm between what may be 
c.alled shortening life and accele ra-
tmg death . Once admit the principle 
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T he Ethics of Euthanasia 
Be fore commenting on William's 
opi n ion a nd the validity of the dis-
tinc t ion between causing death and 
allowi ng a person to die , it is instruc-
tive to look somewhat mo re closely 
a t what can rightly be called the 
ethics of e uthanasia. By doing this 
we will be able to see more clearly 
why many write rs advocate volun-
tary e uthanasia (no one , at least not 
ye t , seems to be call ing for manda-
tory or o bligatory euthanasia) , the 
reaso ns they advance in its support , 
and the presuppositions o r belie fs 
tha t undergird their position . 
The justification of volunta ry e u-
thanasia has been vigorously a rgued 
by Joseph Fletcher, who speaks o f 
the " right of spiritual be ings to use 
inte ll igent control ove r physical na· 
lure rathe r than to submit beastlike 
to its blind workings:·s He continues : 
"Death contro l, like birth co ntro l, 
is a matte r of human dignity. With· 
o ut it pe rsons become puppe ts . To 
perceive this is to grasp the e rro r 
lurking in the notion - widespread 
in medical c ircles - that life as such 
is the highest good."7 It is instruc-
tive to note that Fletcher locates 
oppositio n to the direct killing o f 
human be ings for compassio nate 
reason in the be lief that "life as such 
is the highest good." It is also in-
struc tive to note that some of the 
elements leading Fletcher to his ad-
li S 
. . 
.. 
. . . 
• I 
• J • • 
.. 
. ' . 
. ·. 
voca\ of voluntary e uthan tsia -
a hi1 priority assigned to man's 
rat it ol control of his life , a some-
wha l pejorative evaluation of man's 
bio logical processes, and locating 
opposition to the direct killing of 
human beings in a belief in the ab-
solute inviolability o f life , in re-
garding it as a summum bonum -
are reflected in an influential and 
very perceptive essay by Daniel C. 
Maguire , a Catholic moralist of un-
usual abi lity.8 Although some indi-
viduals may o ppose eutha nasia be-
cause they believe that human life 
itself is the highest good, it is a n 
oversimpl ification to maintain that 
this is the major reason why think-
ing men oppose the ethic o f e uthan-
asia. One need not, indeed ought 
not , maintain that life is the highest 
good in order to oppose direct eu-
thanasia. One need o nly mainta in 
tha t life is a real human good , a 
good just as basic and just as human 
as intelligence or rational contro l, 
in o rder to argue that its deliberate 
and direct destruction inevitably 
means that o ne is turning against a 
basic human good and making it 
something e vil, something to be 
~xterminated , here and now. 
The arguments for euthanasia, 
as Dyc k notes, "focus o n two hu-
m a ne and s ignificant concerns: 
"compassion for those who are pain-
fully and te rminally ill ; concern fo r 
the human dignity associated with 
freedom of cho ice. Compassion and 
freedom are values that sustain and 
enhance the common good.''9 To 
these positive considerations is link-
ed the denial that there is any legiti-
mate moral distinc tion "between 
th<;>se where a patient o r a physi-
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c ian chooses to have life short d 
by failing to accept'or use life ·a-
lo nging techniques and thos m-
stances in which a patient o r 1 si-
cian shortens life by e mploy1 a 
death-dealing chemical or i1 ru-
ment."10 They maintain · that t th-
ing o f c rucial moral significan is 
a t stake in distinguishing bet en 
directly killing someone and di-
rec tly permitting him to die . eir 
reason fo r discounting th i~ lis-
tinctio n, it seems, is that the .ult 
o r conseque nce of the acts inn :ed 
is the same: a human being di At 
the risk of oversimplification . ug-
gest that the e thics of euthan. .1 is 
what can be called an ethics in-
tent; it is an ethics in which th 11a-
jo r determinant (in some v. ters 
e .g. Fletche r, the sole determ 1nt) 
o f the rightness o r wro ngm of 
what one does is the good < evil 
that is both intended by the (ent 
and results from the action tl t he 
undertakes. 
In his pe·rceptive article Jyck 
lists fo ur presuppositions th · he 
believes are operative in this thics 
o f e uthanasia. These can bL -;um-
marized in my parapht'ase of r vck's 
work as fo llows: 
1. An individual human bo: ing's 
life belo ngs to him to d t'ipose 
o f entire ly as he o r she v. ishes. · 
2. The dignity of pe rsonhtlod is 
rooted in personal freedom, a 
freedom that demands the free-
dom to take one's own life. 
3. There is such a thing as a life 
not worth living , whether by 
reason of distress, illness. pain. 
or whatever. 
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4. The only absolute o r supreme 
value is "human dignity," which 
consists in the human being's 
capacity to choose and control 
life and death .n 
The Ethics of Benemortasia 
Those who, like me, oppose an 
ethics of euthanasia and advocate 
an ethics of agathanasia o r bene-
mortasia share the concern of the 
advocates of euthanasia for the 
values of compassion and human 
freedom. They reject the view, set 
forth by some doctors, that the med-
ical professio n and society has a 
moral obligation to p\usue relent-
lessly and aggressively every possi-
ble means of maintaining life until 
the matter is finally beyond every 
human control. They reject, in other 
words, the "save and care" .ethics 
!lS this is understood, fo r e xample , 
by such writers as Gerald Leach.12 
They reject this view because it, like 
the view of the advocates o f euthan-
asia, regards the distinction between 
directly causing death and allowing 
~ person to die as mo rally insigni-
ficant , a "moral quibble." l3 
Those who advocate an ethics of 
benemortasia argue tha t the dis-
tinction cited previously is valid and 
~hat far more than a "mo ral quibble" 
JS at stake. What is at stake is the 
meaning of human existence as a 
moral existence. Not o nly are com-
Passion and freedom human values h . • 
ow we ach1eve these values is 
equally important, for it tells us 
SOmething about our worth as monll 
beings. In other words , an ethics of 
benemortasia is as concerned with 
means as it with ends; it is not simply 
an ethic of intent but an ethics of 
· May, 1974 
intent ontent. By this I mean 
that it s not regard the gond 
consequ es intended by an agent 
a suffic i justifier of his deeds; the 
meaninL significance o f the deeds 
whereh' bt: achieves his good pur-
·poses i~ also a determinant of their 
moralin. For a n ethics of benemor-
tasia a human deed not only gets 
somethmg done, that is, has conse-
quences o r results, but it also gets 
something said, that is , it has some-
thing to te ll us about the meaning 
of our lives.l4 An ethics of bene-
mortasia, consequently , recognizes 
that human freedom is no t an abso-
lute but has certain constra ints, con-
straints that enable human beings 
to be humanly compassio nate and 
humanly free. 
One of the constraints limiting 
human freedom and enabling hu-
man be ings to exercise compassion 
and freedom humanly is the con-
straint o bjectified and articulated 
in the commandment "Thou shalt 
not kill :' What this constraint means 
has been well express by Professor 
Dyck. "The injunctio n not to kill ," 
he writes, 
is part o f a total effort to prevent the 
destruction of the human community. It 
is an absolute prohibition in the sense 
that no society can be indiffe rent about 
the tak ing of human life. Any act , insofar 
as it an act of taking a human life (and 
this is why euthanasia, as an activity di· 
rectly terminating life , is) is wrong: tha t 
is to say , that taking a human life is a 
wrong-making characteristic of actions. 
To say, however. that killing is a prima 
facie wrong does not mean that an act of 
killing may never be justified. For exam-
ple, a person's efforts to prevent some-
one's death may lead to the death of the 
allacker. However, we can morally justify 
that act of intervention o nly because it's 
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an a f saving a life, not becau., 11 is an 
act tking a li fe}5 
Perh< we could put it th b way. 
O ne I man being ought not dtrectfy 
take human life, e ither his o v. n o r 
another's, because no huma n be ing 
exists apart from othe r human be-
ings. And not only is human exis-
tence a coexiste nce, not only is 
being human a being with, it is also 
a being/or. We human beings exist 
with and for o ne anothe r; each o f 
us holds his life at the mercy o f h is 
fe llowmen. I think tha t some th ing 
of profo und Christian meaning is at 
q uestion he re. As Chr istia ns we be-
lieve that huma n beings a re the 
images o f Go d , his living iko ns as it 
were. And just as the living God. the 
o nly God, is an Emmanue l, a God 
who, as Karl Ba rth has noted, exis ts 
" ne ither next to man nor abo1•e him. 
but with him , by him, and above a ll 
for him ,"16 so we. his iko ns o r 
c reated words, ex ist with and fo r 
one another . 
But wha t abo ut ·the distinc tio n 
between ta king a life, causing death 
directly. and pe rmitting a pe rson 
to d ie? Is th is a valid ethica l d is-
tinc tion? Re flectio n on the hum an 
significa nce o r meaning o f o ur 
deeds. I believe. solidly supports 
th is dis tinction. Obvio usly some 
kind of human choice a nd human 
action is involved in both types of 
activity. but the re is a vas t mora l 
difference, a genuine chasm in the 
way the actio n is re lated to the ide n-
tity of the agents respo nsible - the 
way the deed shapes o r forms the 
mo ral be ing of the agent. As Dr. J . 
Russell Elkinton has noted with 
respect to allowing a patient to die, 
11 8 
"it is mo ra lly dec isive tha t the 
tient dies not from the act b ut fr• 1 
the unde rlying d isease or injury 
T o put it d iffe re ntly we can c ite e 
wo rds of Dr. C .B. Giertz. "No ~ p 
is taken with the object of kill g 
the patie nt. We refra in f.ro m _ t ro t-
ment because it does not serve y 
purpose . . . I cannot _regard thi ts 
killing by medical means: death ts 
already won, despite the figh t e 
have put up."18 
M ore positive ly, we can say, ' !h 
Ramsey,19 that the decisio n no • to 
ad minister certain li fe-susta ll tg 
technologies or to cease emplo' tg 
the m is a decis ion to care for te 
dying pe rso n, to minister to his n ds 
as a huma n be ing in the proce· of 
dying and to ma ke his act of d ng 
an act whe re human presence nd 
human concern a re of greater ' uc 
than tubes inserted into noses. ·c-
tums, othe r openings of va r >us 
sorts and so fo rth . 
Ordinary and Extraordinary 
A Distinction 
Traditionally medical eth i c~ has 
distinguished between ordinar_1 and 
extraordinary means of prese t ving 
life: the first have been rega tied 
as mandato ry o r obligatory. w h reas 
the latte r have been regardc l as 
elective. This d ist inc tion bet'' een 
ordina ry and e xtraordinary mt:ans 
is c ruc ia l to unde rstanding the dif-
ference in mentality between an 
ethics of e uthanasia and an et hics 
of be nemo rtasia. T he e thics of bene-
mortasia, as noted already. shares 
the concern for compassion and 
freedom reflected in an ethics of 
euthanasia, but this · concern is fo-
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cussed on the care given to the dy-
ing person . Ramsey expresses this 
very eloquently: 
The dif ference between only caring for 
the dying and acts of euthanasia is not a 
cho ice between indirectly and directly 
wi lling and doing something. It is rather 
the important choice between doing some-
thing and doing nothing, or (better said) 
ceasing to do something that was begun 
in order to do something that is better 
because more fitt ing. In omission no hu-
. man agent causes the patient's death , 
directly or indirectly. He · dies his own 
death from causes that it is no longer mer-
ciful or reasonable to fight by means of 
possible medical intervent ions. Indeed, 
it is not quite right to say that we only 
. care for the dying by an omission, by "do-
ing nothing" directly or indirectly. In-
stead, we cease doing what was once 
called for and begin to do precisely what 
is called for now. We attend and com-
pany with him in th is, his very own dy ing. 
rendering it as comfortable and as digni-
fied as possible.20 
Although giving a patien t a fa ta l 
dose of medicine and turni ng off a 
respirator are both deliberate acts 
and result in the same end - the 
death of the pa tie nt - there is a s ig-
nificant difference between them as 
means or human acts (with Germain 
Grisez21 I ma inta in tha t in the mo ral 
order a means to an e nd is ei the r 
one human act or series of acts and 
not a partial aspect of an act). Ad-
ministering a fa tal drug is to take 
life from the patient ; stopping pro-
cedures that have no reasonable 
hope of success in enabling the pa-
tient to carry o n h is vita l func tions 
With some degree of spontaneity 
and simply provide a mechanical 
way of susta ining life processes is 
to allow the patient to comple te his 
own dying and m ore positively to 
permit his family a nd friends to ta ke 
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appropr 
the ir OP 
ca ring actions to fu lfill 
Lion to care for the I' 1-
tie nt a!> uman pe rson . 
The l nc tion between ordinary 
and ext', tl inary means, or manda-
tory an~ :kct ive procedures. must 
no t (a!> n <my moralists and Pius X II 
have ll lltt:d frequently) be misunder-
s tood. The d istinction is ~ot. as 
M aguire says.22 "faci le," nor is it 
some g immick to save consciences. 
It is a difficult dist inc tion to make, 
but il is one that good medicine can 
and must make. The terms "ord i-
nary" and "extraordinary" are to be 
taken in their mora l sense, and this 
need not coincide with their medical 
meaning in a technological sense. A 
procedure that may be ordinary in 
the medically technological sense 
(e.g., int ravenous feedi ng, the use 
of a heart pacemaker, etc.) because 
they are commonly used may be ex-
traordinary in the mo ral sense. The 
te rms have a great deal of relativity, 
not because of any kind of moral 
re lativism, but because they a re 
re lative to the condition of the pa-
tient, to the morally significant 
r ea lity- ma king facto rs that give 
the m their moral meaning. An in-
travenous feeding that is indeed 
o rdinary and mandatory for a pa~ 
t ie nt of a certa in age, with a parti-
c ular kind of d isease or injury a nd 
reasonable hope of recovery might 
be extraordina ry - indeed might 
const itute a senseless and brutal 
pro longation of an individual's o wn 
dying processes - for a ninety-five-
yea r-old person in a coma, suffering 
in addition from bone cancer a nd 
pne umonia. Among the factors that 
a re reality-making in determining 
the condition of the patient are h is 
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own ft ·dom to die the deal 1 that 
he is i ·act dying and the fact that 
he ha' !ready begun the process of 
dying Although it is no eas) task 
to determine what, in fact, the con-
dition of the patient is - and this 
means that the distinc tion between 
o rdinary and extraordinary is surely 
not "facile" - this is a task at the 
heart of the care that physicians a nd 
medical science can and must ex-
tend to fellow human beings. 
Human Deeds 
An ethics o f benemortasia or 
agathanasia opposes an ethics of 
e uthanasia not only o n the grounds 
that human freedom is limited in its 
exercise by constra ints rooted in 
justice (and in Christian love), no t 
only on the grounds that the dis-
tinction between directly killing a 
human being and allowing him to 
die is valid and not some kind of 
facile gimmick , but also on the 
gro unds that a human being makes 
his moral being o r achieves his 
moral identity in and through his 
deeds. Because of this an ethics of 
benemortasia insists on a truthful 
a nalysis and descriptio n of human 
deeds and argues that any action 
rightly described as an act o f direct 
killing is o ne that human beings 
o ught not to do, because it means 
tha t human being has taken on, as 
part of his moral identity. the iden-
tity of a killer, of a pe rson who re-
pudiates the goodness and worth of 
human existence. 
But when is a human deed pro-
perly and truthfully describable as 
an act of killing, as an act whereby 
the doer inevitably incorporates into 
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his moral being - whether he w· ts 
to or not - the identity of a k il ·? 
After reflecting seriously on im t r-
tant articles bearing on this t• 1c 
by Ramsey,23 Grisez,24 J. G t m 
Gray,25 and Tho mas Aquinas26 · m 
whom, inc ide ntally, bOth G r ~z 
and Ramsey depend in many w; .; ), 
I think that it can be said that a ·r-
son accepts the identity of a k e r 
if he intends the death of ano e r 
human being and he cannot ot 
intend that death if his act is i ; If 
directed against the life of tha t ·r-
son so that his death is the p r. er 
" ta rget" or "end" o f the act itse ll 
Assume now that one come~ )n 
the scene of an a utomobile w• c k 
and discovers a pe rson trapped 1 a 
flaming car and being slowly roa ed 
to death and finds it impossiblt e r-
ther to release him or to exting tsh 
the flames? Wo uld one be takin: o n 
the identity o f :. killer if, in a ca~ · of 
this kind, he we re to shoot the ,e r-
son being roasted to death? ( j his 
case would fall under the sec md 
"qualification;, suggested by Ra msey 
in his important study on our o bitga-
tion to care fo r the dying.27 ) Ct~uld 
I shoot someone in a situation of 
this kind, foresee ing that he is go ing 
to die as a result o f my act, and still 
claim truthfully tha t I am not k ill ing 
him and killing him directly? I be-
lieve that certain disce.rnible fea-
tures or reality-making facJors make 
it possible for one to say that he is 
not. in this type of case, engaged in 
an act of killing and is not directly 
intending death in and through his 
act. A comparison of this kind of 
case with the defense of another hu-
man being fro m an assailant bent 
on killing him is helpful to show why 
Linacre Quarterly 
I have come to thi.s belief. One who 
rescues a fellow human being from 
an assailant of this kind may , of 
,course, be engaged in an act of 
killing - but he may also be engaged 
in an act of justifiable defense. If he 
does intend the death of the assail-
ant, his act is an act of killing; the 
assailant's death is itself the means 
to his end of rescuing the other per-
son, and his action is ta rgeted upon 
his life. His action, in o the r wo rds, is 
an act of killing; its thrust or d irec-
tion is against the life of the assail-
ant ; this is the finis operis and is in-
escapably an element in the finis 
operantis. However he may not in-
tend the death o f the assailant 
(while clearly foreseeing that th e 
assailant will die) , and his action, 
although it results in the assailant's 
death , is targeted no t upo n his life 
but upon the force that the assail-
ant is bringing against his victim.28 
In similar fashion, it can , I believe, 
be argued , in the case o f the person 
being slowly roasted to death in an 
automobile wreck, the action is not 
directed against the ltfe o f the per-
son but upon the agonizing pain the 
person experiences in being roasted 
to death - somewhat in the way 
that an aspirin is directed against 
the pain of a headache. 
The analysis offe red here is of a 
very rare type of case - a case that 
is not any "exceptio n" to o ur obli-
gation to love life and to share life 
With our fellow me n, but is rather a 
case in which facto rs intrins ic to the 
action as a network of relations be-
tween human beings inhe re ntly 
change the species of the action.29 
The analysis, I believe, is truthful. 
Admittedly it may never occur in 
May, 1974 
medical , 
Ramsey 
class -w 
could O L 
,·tice (the "qualificatio n" 
Joses may , he says, be a 
' lit members), but it 
in life. 
Conclusion 
In C<1ncluding this paper, I think 
it worthwhile to note the presup-
posit ions of an ethics of benemorta-
sia or agathanasia , inasmuch as the 
presuppositions of a n ethics of eu-
than asia have a lready been noted . 
According to Professor Dyck an 
ethics of benemortasia , an ethics 
concerned with means as well as 
ends. with the content or signifi-
cance of our .activit ies as well as 
with their intended results, are the 
following (again, I am paraphrasing 
slightly Dyck's formula tion): 
L An individual human being's 
life is not solely a t the disposal 
of that person; every human 
life is part of a human com-
munity that is he ld together in 
part by a respect for life and by 
a love of the lives of its mem-
bers. 
2. The dignity of the person by 
reason of his freedom of cho ice· 
includes the freedom dying 
persons have to refuse non-
curative, life-prolonging inter-
ventions, but does not extend 
to taking one's life or causing 
death. 
3. Every life has some worth. 
4. The supereme value is good-
ness itself to which the dying 
and those who care for the dy-
ing are responsible.30 
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